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Mark Twain once observed: “To do right is noble. To advise others to
do right is also noble and much less trouble to yourself.”1 This partly explains the distance between the values that the legal profession exalts in
principle and rewards in practice. Law schools are no exception. Our official rhetoric celebrates profe ssional ethics and public service. Our institutional priorities marginalize both. Legal ethics are noticeable for
their absence in the core curricula. Only 10% of law schools require pro
bono service by students and fewer still impose any specific obligations
on faculty. Except on ceremonial occasions, we are uncomfortable talking about values. The result is that we too often substitute unimportant
questions we can answer for important ones we cannot.
Conferences like this one are occasions for deeper reflection about the
professional responsibilities of professional schools. My focus here is the
unstated values of our educational culture. This is, I realize, a topic that
most of us approach warily, either as authors or audiences, with good
reason. The subject invites the kind of pompous platitudes well captured
in a New Yorker cartoon, where a monk striding through cloisters assures his companions that “I am too holier than thou.”
I come to the subject of values with more humility but no less conviction. The point of this essay is to raise concerns on several levels. The
first is how we teach, or fail to teach, legal ethics. The second is pro bono
service. And the final concern is the ethical values that we implicitly reinforce, or fail to reinforce, throughout the law school culture.
I. PROFESSIONAL E THICS AND CURRICULAR P RIORITIES
For most of this century, legal ethics as a substantive field rarely rose
above what an early scholar described as “general piffle.”2 Although the
last two decades have witnessed dramatic improvements, our progress
has been uneven and incomplete. Most schools relegate the subject to a
single required course, typically two units, which principally addresses
bar regulatory codes. The result is what William Simon labels “legal eth-

* Professor of Law, Stanford Law School. B.A., 1974, J.D., 1977, Yale Law School. This
essay draws on my previously published articles on teaching legal ethics, which are cited in
notes 2 and 7 infra, as well as my columns as President of the A ssociation of American Law
Schools, which appeared in 1998 Association newsletters.
1. Mark Twain, quoted in Jennifer Brown, Rethinking the Practice of Law, 41 EMORY
L.J. 451, 465 n.61 (1992) (providing several possibilities for the obscure origin of the quotation,
which is attributed to Mark Twain).
2. George Costigen, The Teaching of Legal Ethic, 4 AM . L. SCH . R EV. 290, 295 (1917). For
an overview, see Deborah L. Rhode, Ethics by the Pervasive Method, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC . 31
(1992).
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ics without the ethics.” 3 Students learn what disciplinary rules require
but lack the foundations for critical analysis.
The inadequacy of this approach is of particular concern in bar regulatory contexts where codes are ambiguous or self-serving. For example,
students will learn that the Model Rules prohibit unauthorized practice
of law by nonlawyers, but not that they are indeterminant and inconsistent in application, or that less restrictive licensing alternatives might
better accommodate the public interest.4
Moreover, an excessively doctrinal framework leaves out many of the
crucial issues facing the American legal profession: inadequate access to
justice for low- and moderate-income citizens; disciplinary processes
that provide no effective remedies for most complainants; excessively
adversarial norms that escalate costs for parties and devalue the interests of non-parties; and practice structures that leave half of surveyed
attorneys dissatisfied with their professional lives.5
In the American Bar Association’s mid-l990s study, less than onefifth of lawyers surveyed felt that legal practice had met their expectations in contributing to the social good.6 Yet doctrinally oriented professional responsibility courses fail to address the structural re asons why
legal practice so often falls short.
Neither these systemic problems, nor other common ethical dilemmas, receive significant attention outside of professional responsibility
courses. Few schools make systematic efforts to integrate legal ethics
into the core first-year or upper-level curricula.7 The coverage that does
occur is often superficial or ad hoc, with no assigned reading and no
questions on exams. Most students get too little theory and too little
practice; classroom discussions are too far removed from real life contexts and too uninformed by insights from allied disciplines such as
philosophy, sociology and economics. This minimalist approach to legal
ethics marginalizes its significance. Educational priorities are apparent
in subtexts as well as texts. What the core curricula leaves unsaid sends a
powerful message that no single required course can counteract.
Our failure to make professional responsibility a professional priority
has multiple causes, but faculty reluctance is surely one of them. For
nonexperts in ethics, a little knowledge feels like a dangerous thing and
acquiring more is a time-consuming enterprise. Developing good teaching materials can also be difficult because casebooks outside the field of
professional responsibility rarely provide significant coverage.

3. William Simon, The Trouble with Legal Ethics, 41 J. L EGAL EDUC . 65, 66 (1991).
4. See Deborah L. Rhode, Professionalism in Perspective: Alternative Approaches to
Nonlawyer, 27 N.Y. U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 701, 707-08 (1996) (arguing that the public in terest is marginalized by the bias against alternative legal services); see also Stephen Gillers,
The Anxiety of Influence, 27 F LA. S T . U. L. R EV. 123 (1999).
5. See Deborah L. Rhode, The Professionalism Problem 39 W M . & MARY L. R EV. 283
(1998).
6. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, YOUNG LAWYERS DIVISION , CAREER SATISFACTION 11
(1995).
7. See Deborah L. Rhode, Into the Valley of Ethics: Professional Responsibility and
Educational Reform , 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS . 139 (1995). For efforts to promote curriculum
integration, see Symposium, Teaching Legal Ethics, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. P ROBS . 1 (1995).
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These difficulties are, however, less imposing than faculty members
often assume. An increasing array of curricular integration materials are
available, including annotated bibliographies, videos, simulation exercises, and a paperback text of cases, readings, and problems.8 Most faculty could, with minimal effort, effectively present ethics issues related
to their specialty. The real problem is that most prefer not to.
Part of that reluctance reflects skepticism about the value of discussing values in professional school. To many faculty, postgraduate ethics
instruction promises too little too late. A common assumption is that
moral conduct is primarily a matter of moral character. Students either
have it or they don’t, and postgraduate training is an empty proposition.
As Eric Schnapper once put it, legal ethics “like politeness on subways . .
. and fidelity in marriage” cannot be a cquired through classroom moralizing.9
A related concern is that even if legal education can have some effect
on students’ attitudes, it will have little impact on their later practice.
Moral conduct is highly situational, and critics argue that contextual
pressures are likely to dwarf the effects of law school coverage.10
Such concerns are not without force, but they suggest reasons to
avoid overstating our influence, not reasons to abandon our efforts.
Skeptics are, of course, correct that values do not of themselves determine conduct. One particularly sobering study found no significant differences between the moral beliefs of Illinois ministers and prison inmates.11 Ethical conduct reflects both situational pressures and individual capacities: the ability to recognize and analyze moral issues, the motivation to act morally, and the strength to withstand external influence.
Not all of these characteristics can be taught in law school.
However, some traits are open to influence. Research on ethics education finds that individuals’ moral views and strategies change significantly during early adulthood and that well designed courses can improve capacities for moral reasoning.12 Moreover, many crucial professional responsibility issues are not matters on which students have
strong preexisting convictions. These issues often involve competing
values, and professional standards sometimes depart from personal intuitions. Future practitioners need to know where the bar draws the line
before they are in positions to cross it. Since some of these individuals
eventually will help determine where future lines are drawn, legal education should provide background in the policy considerations at issue.
8. See Deborah L. Rhode, Annotated Bibliography of Educational Materials on Legal
Et h ics, 4 LAW & CONTEMP. P ROBS . 361 (1995).
9. Eric Schnapper, The Myth of Legal Ethics , A.B.A. J. , Feb. 1978, at 202, 205; see also
Terrance Sandelow, The Moral Responsibility of Law Schools, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC . 163, 169
(1984).
10. A vast array of research documents how moral conduct is influenced by authority,
stress, competition, peer influence, financial incentives, time constraints, and similar pressures.
See the studies summarized in Rhode, supra note 2, at 45-46.
11. See Peter Coles, On the Teaching of Ethics in a Pluralist Society, H ASTINGS CENTER
R EP ., Oct. 1978, at 32.
12. See James R. Rest, Can Ethics Be Taught in Professional Schools? Easier Said Than
Done, P SYCHOL. R ES., Winter 1988, at 22, 23-24; see also James S. Leming, Curricu lar Effectiveness in Moral Values Education: A Review of Research, 10 J. OF MORAL EDUC . 147 (1981).
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So too, despite the importance of situational pressures in practice,
psychological research generally finds that moral judgement influences
moral conduct. 13 Education can affect the way individuals evaluate the
consequences of their decisions and respond to the economic and organizational incentives underlying ethical problems. In fact, most surveyed
attorneys believe that the ethics instruction they received in law school
has been helpful to them in practice and should be maintained or expanded.14
For many faculty, however, the greatest obstacle to covering legal
ethics material involves fewer doubts about its effectiveness than about
their own. Many are understandably uncomfortable when venturing into
value-laden discussion. Most of us prefer questions we can confidently
answer and are wary about either pronouncing or withholding judgment
on ethical issues. To take a moral position risks turning podiums into
pulpits and silencing students with different views. Yet to reserve judgment risks fostering relativism and cynicism. Everyone’s view becomes
as good as everyone else’s, and an atmosphere meant to foster tolerance
can undermine commitment. The dilemma is real, but the answer is not
to avoid the ethical issues that present it. We cannot be value neutral on
matters of value. What we choose to discuss itself conveys a moral message, and silence is a powerful subtext. If we decline to put ethical issues
on our agenda, we suggest that professional responsibility is someone
else’s responsibility. And we encourage future practitioners to do the
same.
The alternative is to encourage toleration without endorsing agnosticism. Although many ethical questions yield no objectively valid answers, not all answers are equally valid; some are more consistent, coherent, and respectful of available evidence. So too, the risks of prosel ytizing are by no means unique to issues of professional responsibility.
Professors can abuse their prerogatives by self-righteous or peremptory
pronouncements on any subject. We don’t avoid the difficulty by avoiding ethics. The answer rather is to educate educators.
To make professional values central in professional schools requires a
significant institutional commitment. The conventional approach—add
ethics and stir—is inadequate to the task. Professional responsibility issues need to be integrated into the core curriculum, not isolated in a few
specialized courses or ceremonial platitudes. Strategies for institutionalizing ethics are not in short supply. Law schools can support curricular
integration of professional responsibility through course development
stipends, research assistance, release time, and faculty workshops. Legal
ethics topics can be included in orientation programs, writing a ssignments, skills exercises, moot court competitions, and trial advocacy

13. See Walter Mischel & Harriet N. Mischel, A Cognitive Social Learning Ap proach to
Morality and Self Regulation, in MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND BEHAVIOR: THEORY, R ESEARCH ,
AND SOCIAL I SSUES 84, 101-07 (Thomas Likona, ed. 1976); see also Albert Ban dura, Social Cog nitive Theory of Moral Thought and Action, in 1 HANDBOOK OF MORAL BEHAVIOR AND
DEVELOPMENT 45, 53 (William Kurtines & Jacob L. Gewirtz eds., 1991).
14. See F RANCES K. ZEMANS & VICTOR R OSENBLUM , THE MAKING OF A P UBLIC P ROFESSION
176-77 (l981).
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projects. Coverage can be monitored by reports to the dean and questions on student evaluations.
In short, our current treatment of professional responsibility r eflects
a wide and unnecessary distance between our rhetorical commitments
and institutional priorities. Students recognize the gap. We should as
well.
II. PRO B ONO OPPORTUNITIES
A similar gap persists in law school pro bono policies. In 1996, the
American Bar Association amended its accreditation standards to call on
schools to “encourage students to participate in pro bono activities and
to provide opportunities for them to do so.”15 The revised ABA standards
also encourage schools to address the obligations of faculty to the public,
including participation in pro bono activities. Although a growing number of schools have made efforts to increase pro bono involvement, substantial challenges remain. Only about ten percent of schools require any
service by students and fewer still i mpose specific requirements on faculty.16 At some of these schools, the amounts demanded are quite minimal: less than twenty hours by the time of graduation.17 Over ninety percent of institutions offer voluntary pr ograms, but their scope and quality
varies considerably. About one-third of schools have no law-related pro
bono projects or projects involving less than fifty participants per year.
At other schools, only a small percentage of the class is involved. As a
consequence, most law students graduate without legal pro bono work as
part of their educational experience.18
That lack of involvement is reflected among practitioners. Bar ethical
codes have long proclaimed that all lawyers have obligations to assist individuals who cannot afford counsel. And lawyers who have assumed
those obligations have made enormous contributions to the public interest. Yet the proportion of lawyers who contribute has remained unfortunately small. Few lawyers come close to satisfying the American Bar Association’s Model Rules, which provide that “a lawyer should aspire to
render at least 50 hours of pro bono publico legal services per year,”
primarily to “persons of limited means or to organizations assisting such
persons.”19 Recent estimates indicate that most attorneys do not perform
significant pro bono work, and that most of their assistance does not go
to low-income clients. The average for the profession as a whole is less
than half an hour per week.20

15. ABA, RECODIFICATION OF ACCREDITATION STANDARDS 302, 414 (1996).
16. See W ILLIAM P OWERS , ABA, R EPORT ON LAW SCHOOL P RO BONO ACTIVITIES 2, 5 (1994)
(reporting pro bono requirements for students in 17 of 172 responding schools and requirements for faculty in 3 of 105 responding schools).
17. The lowest minimum required appears to be eight hours. See id. at 3.
18. See id.; see also ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS , C OMMISSION ON P RO BONO
AND P UBLIC SERVICE O PPORTUNITIES IN LAW SCHOOLS , LEARNING TO SERVE: A SUMMARY OF THE
F INDINGS AND R ECOMMENDATIONS OF THE AALS COMMISSION ON P RO BONO AND P UBLIC SERVICE
OPPORTUNITIES 4 (1998).
19. MODEL R ULES OF P ROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 6.1 (1998).
20. See Tigran W. Elred & Thomas W. Schoenherr, The Lawyer’s Duty of Public Ser vice:
More than Charity?, 96 W. VIRG . L. R EV. 367, 384 (l994); see also Rhode, su pra note 5, at 291.
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What legal education could or should do to expand such public service commitments is subject to increasing debate. To encourage a more
informed analysis of these issues, the Association of American Law
Schools appointed a Commission on Public Service and Pro Bono Opportunities in Law Schools, which has just i ssued a preliminary report.
The central conclusion of that report, as well as my own prior work, is
that law schools could and should do more.21
The rationale for pro bono service by law students depends partly on
the rationale for pro bono service by lawyers. Such assistance rests on
two premises: First, that access to legal services is a fundamental need,
and second, that lawyers have a responsibility to help make those services available. As courts and commentators have o ften recognized, the
right to sue and defend is a right that protects all other rights.22 Moreover, in a democratic social order, equality before the law is central to the
rule of law and to the legitimacy of the state. In most circumstances, access to justice is meaningless without access to legal assistance. Our legal
processes are designed by and for lawyers, and lay participants who attempt to navigate without counsel are generally at a disadvantage. Those
disadvantages are particularly great among the poor, who lack lawyers
for over three quarters of their legal needs and who also typically lack
the
education
and
experience
necessary
for
effective
selfrepresentation.23 Inequalities in legal representation compound other
social inequalities and undermine our commitments to procedural fairness and social justice.
While most lawyers acknowledge that access to legal assistance is a
fundamental interest, they are divided over whether the profession has
any special responsibility to provide that assistance, and, if so, whether
the responsibility should be mandatory. According to some attorneys, if
equal justice under law is a societal value, society as a whole should bear
its cost. 24 The poor have fundamental needs for food and medical care,
but we do not r equire grocers or physicians to donate their help in
meeting those needs. Why should lawyers’ responsibilities be greater?
One answer is that the legal profession has a monopoly on the provision of essential services. The American bar has guarded those privileges
and its success in restricting lay competition has helped to price services
out of the reach of many consumers.25 Under these circumstances, it is
not unreasonable to expect lawyers to make some pro bono contributions in return for their protected status. Nor would it be inappropriate

21. See AALS COMMISSION, supra note 15; see also Deborah L. Rhode, Cultures of Co mmitment: Pro Bono For Lawyers and Law Schools, F ORDHAM L. R EV. (forthcoming).
22. See DAVID LUBAN, L AWYERS AND J USTICE : AN ETHICAL STUDY 257-66 (1988); see also
Frank Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to Protect One’s
Rights, 1973 DUKE L. R EV. 1153, 1172.
23. See COMMITTEE TO I MPROVE THE AVAILABILITY OF LEGAL SERVICES , F INAL R EPORT TO
THE CHIEF J UDGE OF THE STATE OF N EW YORK , reprinted in 19 HOFSTRA LAW R EV. 755, 773
(1991); ACCESS TO J USTICE W ORKING GROUP , S TATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA , AND J USTICE F OR ALL:
F ULFILLING THE P ROMISE OF ACCESS TO CIVIL J USTICE IN CALIFORNIA 33-34 (l996).
24. See Marvin E. Frankel, Proposal: A National Legal Service, 45 S.C. L. REV. 887, 890
(l994); see also F INAL R EPORT TO NEW YORK , supra note 23, at 782.
25. See Rhode, supra note 4.
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to expect comparable contributions from other professionals who have
similar monopolies over provision of critical services.
A second objection to pro bono responsibilities, particularly those
that are mandatory, is that many attorneys will be unable or unwilling to
provide cost-effective services. Having corporate atto rneys dabble in
poverty law is an inefficient way of assisting the poor. Yet we lack adequate experience and research concerning various types of pro bono
programs to provide an accurate assessment of that objection. Many bar
and law school pro bono programs have developed training and placement strategies designed to minimize quality problems and many mandatory proposals would allow practitioners to substitute financial support for direct service.26 In any event, the question is always: “Compared
to what?” For most indigent clients, some access to legal assistance is
preferable to none, which is their current alternative.
There are, moreover, other benefits from pro bono programs that
critics fail to acknowledge, and those benefits extend to law students as
well as lawyers. For example, these programs provide many participants
with their only direct knowledge of how the system functions, or fails to
function, for the “have-nots.” To give broad segments of the bar some
experience with what passes for justice among the poor may lay foundations for constructive social change.
Pro bono work also offers lawyers and law students a range of practical benefits, such as training, trial experience, and professional contacts.
Involvement in community groups, charitable organizations, and public
interest activities is a way for individuals to expand their perspectives,
enhance their reputations, explore alternative work options, and build
problem solving skills. Pro bono work benefits participants collectively
as well as individually. According to pu blic opi nion polls, provision of
free legal services is one of the best ways to improve the public standing
of lawyers.27 And according to AALS survey data, law school pro bono
activity is a similarly val uable way of generating good will with alumni
and with the broader community.28
In addition to these educational and practical benefits, law school pro
bono programs serve a final, equally significant objective; they encourage public service by practitioners. As former Tulane dean John Kramer
has noted, the hope is that pro bono experience in law school will inspire
long-term commitments that will “trickle up” to the profession generally. 29 That hope is widely shared. Ninety-five percent of deans responding to the AALS survey agreed that it is an important goal of law

26. For training, see John Greenya, Partners in Justice: Mentoring in the Pro Bono Program, W ASH. L AW., May-June 1997, at 26-28. See also Eileen J. Williams, PSAC in Action,
W ASH. LAW., May-June 1996, at 36-38. For mandatory proposals, see David Luban, J. OF LEGAL
EDUC . (forthcoming, 1999); Marc Galanter & Thomas Palay, Let Firms Buy and Sell Credit for
Pro Bono, NAT’L L.J. , Sept. 6, 1993, at 17.
27. See Gary Henstler, Vox Populi , A.B.A. J. , Sept. 1993, at 61.
28. AALS COMMISSION, supra note 18.
29. John Kramer, Law Schools and the Delivery of Legal Services: First, Do No Harm, in
CIVIL J USTICE : AN AGENDA FOR THE 1990 S 47, 55 (Esther F. Lardent ed., 1989).
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schools to instill in students a sense of obligation to perform pro bono
service.30
Although we lack systematic studies about the effectiveness of law
school programs in accomplishing that goal, the limited available data
points in positive directions. Surveys at several schools with pro bono
requirements indicate that most students report that public service experience has increased their willingness to contribute pro bono services
after graduation. Other research on American volunteer activity similarly
suggests that youthful involvement in public service increases the likelihood of adult participation.31
Given this range of benefits, it is hard to find anyone who opposes law
school pro bono programs, at least in principle. But, in practice, there is
considerably less consensus about the form these programs should take
and the priority they should assume in a world of scarce institutional resources.
Law schools vary considerably in their approach to pro bono service.
Student involvement ranges from highly structured mandatory service
requirements of up to seventy hours in law-related work to occasional
contributions involving soup kitchens, food drives, and similar charitable programs.32 This public service activity serves multiple goals that
have different educational and resource implications. To identify an appropriate pro bono strategy, schools need to determine which goals have
priority and how they fit with other institutional capacities and constraints.
For most law schools, the primary objectives of pro bono pr ograms
are to encourage future public service and to provide an effective educational experience for students. The difficulties in designing programs
arise from the absence of consensus on how to achieve the first of these
objectives and on the conflicts involved in trying to achieve both.
According to some educators, if the principal goal of law school pro
bono programs is to maximize future contributions by lawyers, then we
should maximize contributions by students through required service.
Such requirements send the message that pro bono work is a professional obligation, and often convert individuals who would not voluntarily participate. Yet, we lack sufficient research to determine whether
mandatory programs in fact yield greater long-term pro bono contributions than well-supported optional alternatives. Some law school administrators also are concerned that required participation fails to insure quality services by unmotivated students, and undermines the voluntary ethic that is necessary to sustain commitment after graduation.33
Further difficulties arise in some communities, where current public interest legal opportunities cannot adequately accommodate all graduating
students’ skills, schedules, and time constraints.
30. See AALS COMMISSION, supra note 18.
31. See VIRGINIA A. H ODGKINSON ET AL., GIVING AND VOLUNTEERING IN THE UNITED
STATES : FINDINGS FROM A NATIONAL SURVEY, 12-13, 87-88 (1996); see also E. Gil Clary & Jude
Miller, Socialization and Situational Influences on Sustained Altruism, 57 CHILD DEV. 1359,
1365-66 (1986).
32. See AALS COMMISSION, supra note 18.
33. See AALS COMMISSION, F OCUS GROUP I NTERVIEWS, supra note 18.

1999]

PR O F E SS IO N AL IS M

201

Mandatory pro bono programs for students also raise awkward issues
for professors, who generally resist required service for themselves. Of
course, as they argue, these programs serve educational values apart
from reinforcing a service ethic and such values provide some basis for
including only students. But if law schools’ primary goal is to create a
culture of commitment to public service, then exempting faculty role
models is counterproductive. As research on giving behavior makes
clear, individuals learn more by example than exhortation.34 Unless and
until faculty are willing to include them selves in any mandatory program, a voluntary alternative has certain obvious advantages.
But it has obvious limitations as well. At most schools, voluntary programs attract relatively small numbers of participants, modest institutional resources, and few efforts at quality control. Unless and until
more institutions make support for volunteer work a priority, a culture
of commitment will be impossible to sustain.
In short, the single most important insight from law school pro bono
efforts is that no single model is clearly preferable. Different approaches
create different tradeoffs, which vary at different institutions. But certain
strategies are likely to prove beneficial, no matter what kind of program
is in place. At a minimum, as the AALS Commission has recommended,
law schools should “seek to make available for every law student at least
one well supervised law related pro bono opportunity and either require
student participation or find ways to attract the great majority of students to volunteer.”35 To that end, schools need to provide adequate resources, recognition, and r ewards for public service. For example,
schools can note students’ public service on transcripts, diplomas, or
honor rolls. Outstanding pro bono contributions by students, faculty,
and alumni can be showcased in school publications, awards, and cer emonial events. Faculty public service could be encouraged by appropriate policies and incentive structures, such as those requiring professors
to report on their annual pro bono activity and ensuring that they receive
adequate institutional credit for their involvement.
Law school pro
bono programs also can develop more extensive pro bono partnerships
with bar, alumni, and community networks. Also, organizations like the
ABA and AALS could insist that schools provide concrete information
about the effectiveness of public service initiatives.
III. EDUCATIONAL CULTURE AND PROFESSIONAL VALUES
Finally, and most important, pro bono strategies need to be part of
broader efforts to encourage a sense of professional responsibility for the
public interest. As research on legal education has long noted, the “latent
curriculum” at most law schools works against that sense of responsibility. Traditional teaching methods offer a steady succession of hard cases
and doctrinal ambiguities that leave many st udents skeptical at best and
34. See ALFIE KOHN, T HE BRIGHTER SIDE OF H UMAN NATURE: ALTRUISM AND EMPATHY IN
EVERYDAY LIFE 91 (1990); see also James H. Bryan et al., Words and Deeds About Altruism and
Subsequent Reinforcement Power of the Model, 42 CHILD DEV., 1501, 1505-07 (1971); Joan E.
Grusec, The Socialization of Altruism, in P ROSOCIAL BEHAV . 9, 13 (Margaret S. Clark ed., 1991).
35. AALS COMMISSION, supra note 18.
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cynical at worst: There is “always an argument the other way and the
devil often has a very good case.”36 Too often legal coursework seems
largely a matter of technical craft, divorced from the broader concerns of
social justice that led many students to law schools. The shortage of
public interest fellowships and limitations of loan forgiveness programs
further undermines those concerns.
Countering these forces will require a substantial commitment. But
there is much to gain and little to lose from the effort. Enlarging students’ sense of professional responsibility while in law school reinforces
their best instincts and aspirations. By making professionalism a priority, legal educators can reinforce the same aspirations in themselves.

36. Stewart Macaulay, Law School and the World Outside the Doors, 25 (Madison, Wi sconsin: University of Wisconsin Working Paper, 1982); see also Jay Feinman and Marc Feld man, Pedagogy and Politics , 73 GEO L.J. 875, 878 (1985). For the erosion of public in terest
commitments, generally, see R OBERT V. STOVER, M AKING I T AND BREAKING IT : THE F ATE OF
P UBLIC I NTEREST COMMITMENT DURING LAW SCHOOL (1989) and R OBERT GRANFIELD , THE
MAKING OF ELITE LAWYERS (1992).

